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A CLOSE CORPORATION CHECKLIST FOR DRAFTING
THE CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION UNDER
THE NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
ROBERT A. KESSLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
A GREAT deal has been written about the "close corporation," its
problems under corporation statutes designed more appropriately
for public issue corporations, and ways of fulfilling the desires of close-
corporate participants by twisting the statutory pattern to fit their
peculiar needs.' This article will not reconsider all that has gone before,
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., O"Neal, Close Corporations (1953); O'Neal & Derv.in, Expulsion or Oppr,-
sion of Business Assodates: "Squeeze-Outs" in Small Enterprises (1961); Rohrlich, Organiz-
ing Corporate and Other Business Enterprises §§ 4.19-.23 (3d ed. 1958); Seward, Basic
Corporate Practice 54-64 (1960); Ballard, Arrangements for Participation in Corporate
Management Under the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, 25 Temp. L.Q. 131 (1951);
Burstein, The Dissolution of Closed Corporations, 123 N.Y.LJ. 1464, 1484, 1504 (1950);
Cary, How Ilinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnerhip Advantagis: Planning for the
Closely Held Firm, 43 Nw. U.L. Rev. 427 (1953); Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man
Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, IS Law & Contemp. Prob. 473 (1953); Cataldo,
Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 Va. L. Rev. 229 (1951); Chayes,
Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (1960); Delaney, The
Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be Tied in Advance, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 52 (1950);
Fleming, Desirability of Enacting Separate Statutes for Closely Held and Publicly Owned
Corporations, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 17 (1957); Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study
of the One-Mlan Company, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1373 (1933); Gower, The English Private
Company, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 535 (1953) ; Hayes, Corporation Cake With Partnerzhip
Frosting, 40 Iowa L. Rev. 157 (1954); Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporation
in New York Under Its New Business Corporation Law, 23 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1 (1951);
Hornstein, Controversies Under Stockholders' Agreements, 5 Arb. J. (ns.) 62 (1950); Horn-
stein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 435
(1953); Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 Yale
L.J. 1040 (1950); Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 Cornell L.Q. 4S3 (1943);
Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existences, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 773 (1952); Kezzler,
The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 42-67 (1961); Kezzler,
The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 696 (1960); Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close
Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, IS Law & Contemp. Prob. 505 (1953); Latty, The
Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. Rev.
432 (1956); Lyon, Federal Income Taxation, 1953 Ann. Survey Am. L. 269; Bfed:, Em-
ployment of Corporate Executives by Majority Stockholders, 47 Yale L.J. 1079 (1938);
O'Neal, Arbitration in Close Corporations: A Study in Legislative Needs, 12 Arb. J. (ns.)
191 (1957) ; O'Neal, Arrangements Which Protect Minority Shareholders Against "Squeeze-
Outs," 45 Mlinn. L. Rev. 537 (1961); O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate
Derisions: Use of Special Charter and By-Law Provisions, IS Law & Contemp. Prob. 451
(1953); O'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations: Optional
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but will, instead, presume that the reader is generally familiar with the
literature and problems of close corporations and desires some guide
to the application of his knowledge to the specific problem of drafting
the appropriate papers for a close corporation under the new New York
Business Corporation Law'
Charter Clauses, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1956); O'Neal, Oppugnancy and Oppression In Close
Corporations: Remedies in America and in Britain, 1 Boston College Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1
(1959); O'Neal, Protecting Shareholders' Control Agreements Against Attack, 14 Bus. Law.
184 (1958); O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 341 (1958); O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: Intra-
Institutional Arbitration, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 786 (1954); O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer
of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 773
(1952); Peril, The Uses of Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans for Small or Medium-Sized
Businesses, 66 Dick. L. Rev. 143 (1962); Plate, Oppression as a Basis for Dissolving a
Solvent Corporation, 30 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 478 (1961); Rice, The Valuation of Close Held
Stocks: A Lottery in Federal Taxation, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 367 (1950); Robinson, Share-
holders' Agreements and The Statutory Norm, 43 Cornell L.Q. 68 (1957); Rohrllcb, Legal
Problems in the Organization and Structure of a Close Business Corporation, 124 N.Y.L.J.
266, 274 (1950); Specter, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans: Coverage and Operation for
Closely Held Corporations and Professional Associations, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 335 (1962);
Strecker, Corporate Buy-Sell Agreements: Tax Problems in Drafting, 15 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 18 (1958); Treillard, The Close Corporation in French and Continental Law, 18
Law & Contemp. Prob. 546 (1953); Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corpora-
tion, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 273 (1929); Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation
Law," 28 Cornell L.Q. 313 (1943); Symposium: New York Business Corporation Law,
11 Buffalo L. Rev. 429 (1962); Symposium, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 433 (1953);
Symposium-The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 345 (1957); The Use of Life
Insurance to Fund Agreements Providing for Disposition of a Business Interest at Death,
71 Harv. L. Rev. 687 (1958); A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close
Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 700 (1958). See also Henn, Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises 401-47 (1961); Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice (1959).
2. Hereinafter referred to in text as B.C.L. The New York Business Corporation Law
has already been the subject of extensive law review comment. See Anderson & Lesher,
The New Business Corporation Law, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 308, 428 (1961); de Capriles & McAnlff,
The Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New York Business Corporation Law, 36
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1239 (1961); Fuld, New York's New Business Corporation Law, 19 N.Y.
County Lawyers Ass'n B. Bull. 52 (1961) ; Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corpora-
tion in New York Under Its New Business Corporation Law, 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1 (1961);
Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (1961); Simon
& Davis, The New York Business Corporation Law and the Department of State, 36 St.
John's L. Rev. 205 (1962); Stevens, New York Business Corporation Law of 1961, 47
Cornell L.Q. 141 (1962); Symposium: New York Business Corporation Law, 11 Buffalo L.
Rev. 429 (1962), containing the following articles: Lesher, Introduction to Symposium on
New York Business Corporation Law, id. at 429; Henn, The Philosophies of the New York
Business Corporation Law of 1961, id. at 439; de Capriles, New York Business Corporation
Law: Article 5-Corporate Finance, id. at 461; Stevens, Close Corporations and the New
York Business Corporation Law of 1961, id. at 481; Hoffman, The Status of Shareholders
and Directors Under New York's Business Corporation Law: A Comparative View, Id. at
496; Latty, Some General Observations on the New Business Corporation Law of New York,
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This work will, then, as its title implies, do little more than list possible
subjects (with a brief comment on each) which the experienced prac-
titioner may (or may not) decide should be covered in the certificate of
incorporation of his close New York corporation. The specific form
which provisions on these matters should take will not be set forth
verbatim for two reasons: first, every close corporation is an individual,
and like an individual person, may wear ready-made "clothes," but
will look better in custom-made ones, or at least ones that are "cut
to measure," and hence, forms for various provisions are really
dangerous since the tendency is to copy them all with raffish results,
while the task of "piecing" the needed provisions is often more difficult
than the actual drafting of a whole set of certificate provisions to meet
the specific needs of the client; and, second, for those who want the
aid of suggested forms, and are willing to make the necessary modifica-
tions which any form entails, a number are already available, if not
from practice under the present law, then from numerous other sources.'
This article will, therefore, merely pinpoint the areas in which the
close-corporation practitioner may want to consider drafting or modify-
ing a ready-made form to cover the matter.
Participants in a close corporation ordinarily have two main demands:
(1) A proper share of the profits (equal or unequal as the individual
situation may dictate); (2) A proper voice in the management (also
equal or unequal as the clients' wishes dictate). An obvious method
of providing for the first is through the terms of stock ownership; while
id. at 591. In addition, a number of student comments on various facets of the new law
have appeared: Article V of the New York Business Corporation Law: Corporate Finance,
13 Syracuse L. Rev. 93 (1961); Corporations: Domestic Regulation of Foreign Corpora-
tions: Concept of "Domiciled Foreign Corporation": New York Buiness Corporation Law
of 1961, 47 Cornell L.Q. 263 (1962); Particular Problems Under the New York Buiness
Corporation Law, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 615 (1962); Section 1312 of the Businem Corporation
Law: The Dilemma of Legislative History and judicial Interpretation, 30 Fordham L.
Rev. 331 (1961); Shareholder Liability for Wages: Section 630 of the New York Buineos
Corporation Law, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 471 (1962). There were a number of Bar Aszodation
Reports. See, e.g., Report on New York Business Corporation Law, Committee on Corpora-
tion Law, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 435 (1961). A list of official materials is found in Henn, The
Philosophies of the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 439,
440-41 nn.11 & 12 (1962). Caveat: A number of the above were written before the most
recent amendments. The 1962 amendments are summarized in Rohrlich, The Businez3 Cor-
poration Law-1962 Amendments, 148 N.Y.L.J. No. 25, at 4 (Aug. 6, 1962). An excellent
and up-to-date (including the 1962 amendments) analysis of the new law by Profecsor
Hornstein appears in 'McKinney's N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, AppendL 2 (reprinted from 2
Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice (Supp. 1962)).
3. See, e.g., Israels & Gorman, Corporate Practice (P.L.I. 1957); 2 O'Neal, Cloze Cor-
porations 23S-334 (1958); Fletcher, Corporation Forms Annotated (3d ed. 1957); 3 & 4
Am. Jur. Legal Forms, Corporations (1953) (Supp. 1961).
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the second may be easily accomplished through manipulation of the
management structure in the corporation (so far as that is legally pos-
sible).
Unfortunately for neat conceptualism, the two categories often over-
lap: The "proper share" is often taken in the form of salaries as an
officer or employee rather than through dividends. This necessitates
a management structure which will guarantee continued employment.
Thus, management structure provisions overlap share of profit pro-
visions. Stock provisions also carry management power because of the
particular voting (or nonvoting) rights attendant upon the various
stock classes and hybrids chosen. Provisions determining the share of
profits, therefore, inevitably overlap management structure provisions.
Solely because some organization seems necessary, then, and with the
caveat that a provision from one category may well affect a provision
from another, the first two divisions of the checklist will be divided
between "stock or share provisions,"4 and "management structure"
suggestions.
It is also universally recognized that the more effective the manage-
ment structure is in giving appropriate voice to the demands of the
close-corporate participants, the more likely "deadlocks" are to arise.
Provisions are, therefore, necessary to deal with such situations.
Methods of solving deadlock problems will, accordingly, form the third
segment of the checklist.
Since it is almost always true that some phenomena fall outside
of recognized concepts, there usually must be a "miscellaneous" category
in which to lump them, hence, an "additional provisions" segment.
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The new B.C.L. attempts to liberalize the New York law in regard
to close corporations. The principal section designed to do this is
section 620.1 In the statute as originally enacted, this provision was one
4. This includes share dispositions when participants die, desire to leave the business
or retire. Such provisions are, of course, necessary to subserve both the ends of "proper
share" and "proper say."
5. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620 provides: "(a) An agreement between two or more share-
holders, if in writing and signed by the parties thereto, may provide that in exercising any
voting rights, the shares held by them shall be voted as therein provided, or as they may
agree, or as determined in accordance with a procedure agreed upon by them. (b) A pro-
vision in the certificate of incorporation otherwise prohibited by law as improperly restrictive
of the discretion or powers of the directors in their management of corporate affairs as
provided in this chapter shall nevertheless be valid: (1) If all the incorporators or holders
of record of all outstanding shares, whether or not having voting power, have authorized
such nrovision in the certificate of incorporation or an amendment thereof; and (2) If,
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of the most poorly drafted portions of the entire law. An amendment
this year, however, has clarified it considerably. Nevertheless, there
is still an automatic termination of the benefits of section 620(b)-
provisions otherwise "improperly restrictive of the discretion or powers
of the directors"-not only whenever the corporation goes public, but
also whenever shares are transferred or issued to persons who do not
have "knowledge or notice" of such provisions, unless they consent in
writing to be bound by them. The amendment requires that notice of
such provisions be contained on each certificate of stock,0 but it does
not expressly make such notice sufficient to defeat the automatic termi-
nation which will otherwise result from a transfer to persons without
"knowledge or notice." Of course, properly interpreted, the statute will
never invalidate such close-corporation provisions where the corporation
has issued all of its stock certificates with a reference to the provisions
contained on them.7 However, the statute is new, and quite radical. There
is no guarantee that it will be properly interpreted,' and it does not, as it
subsequent to the adoption of such provision, shares are transferred or issued only to
persons who had knowledge or notice thereof or consented in writing to such provi ion.
(c) A provision authorized by paragraph (b) shall be valid only so long as the shares of the
corporation are not traded on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in an over-
the-counter market by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities -z'odation.
(d) An amendment to strike out a provision authorized by paragraph (b) shall be authorized
at a meeting of shareholders by vote of the holders of two-thirds of all outstanding shares
entitled to vote thereon or by the holders of such greater proportion of shares as may be
required by the certificate of incorporation for that purpose. (e) The effect of any such
provision authorized by paragraph (b) shall be to relieve the directors and impo:e upon
the shareholders consenting thereto the liability for managerial acts or omissions that is
imposed on directors by this chapter to the extent that and so long as the discretion or
powers of the directors in their management of corporate affairs is controlled by any such
provision. (f) If the certificate of incorporation of any corporation contains a provison
authorized by paragraph (b), notice of the existence of such provision shall appear plainly
on the face or back of every certificate for shares issued by such corporation."
6. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(f).
7. Transfer of legal title to shares of stock, according to N.Y. Per. Prop. Law § 162
(Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 1), requires transfer of the certificate. Hence, in the ordinary
case it should be difficult to deny knowledge when the notice appears on the stock certificate
as the statute requires. However, there are apparently possibilities of a pason being a
shareholder without any certificates ever having been issued to him (see Gale-Hasslacher
Corp. v. Carmen Contracting Corp., 219 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1961)), and certainly
equitable ownership of shares is possible. The Uniform Commercial Code, effective Sept. 27,
1964, seems to increase the possibilities of a transfer of shares without delivery of the cer-
tificate. See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 3-313, 3-320.
S. Compare, e.g., Dean Stevens' intimation that the new law may allow a corporation to
abolish the board completely (Stevens, Close Corporations and the New York Businczs
Corporation Law of 1961, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 431, 490 (1962)), vith Anderson and Leher's
statement that "The new Business Corporation Law was drafted upon the basic philosophy
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easily could have, make the certificate legend conclusive proof of "knowl-
edge" by the transferee. Until such time as the statute is again amended to
do this, wise practitioners will not place their sole reliance on this section
when planning their close-corporate setup. Furthermore, any provisions
which are only sanctioned by section 620(b) should also be carefully
separated in the certificate from provisions which are necessary to suc-
cessful close-corporate operation, but which are lawful without resort
to section 620(b). Thus, if the section 620(b) provisions fall as a result
of transfer of shares to a nonconsenting shareholder without "knowledge
or notice," the desired system of operation can still be maintained. The
aim, therefore, is to insure the desired financial and management structure
even without resort to section 620(b) provisions, which should, at best,
be "additional provisions," carefully labelled to insure that they are the
only ones susceptible of such automatic termination. Provisions likely
to be held within the scope of section 620(b) will, therefore, be placed
under the "additional provisions" portion of the checklist. It is dis-
appointing for close-corporation law practitioners to realize that all
the old case law on permissible deviations from "statutory norms" may
still survive when courts are faced with the problem of determining
whether or not such a close-corporation arrangement has automatically
terminated.
In addition to the first general observation that many provisions which
would not be valid under present law should be avoided, or, if not
omitted, should be separately treated to avoid invalidation of the entire
planned setup, another and less distressing general observation should
be made. The new law, unlike the present statutes, expressly provides
that the certificate of incorporation may contain any provision which the
law states is a proper subject for inclusion in the bylaws.' Wise prac-
titioners, of course, want to include all necessary close-corporation pro-
of a strong board of directors." Anderson & Lesher, The New Business Corporation Law,
33 N.Y.S.B.J. 308, 428 (1961). Dean Stevens was Chief Consultant to the Joint Legislative
Committee which drafted the statute, while Sen. Warren M. Anderson was Chairman of
the Committee and Robert S. Lesher was Counsel to the Committee. Even properly Inter-
preted, of course, § 620 will not give a carte blanche to every close-corporate arrange-
ment. See Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1,
42-55 (1961). Unquestionably, such extra-parametral arrangements as that in Nickolopoulos
v. Sarantis, 102 N.J. Eq. 585, 141 AtI. 792 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928) are not validated. A
further disadvantage of N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) provisions is that they impose
directorial liability upon all "shareholders consenting thereto." N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 620(e). (Quaere: Who are consenting shareholders when the § 620(b) provisions are
in the certificate of incorporation?) Perhaps even inactive shareholders will be held liable.
See Recent Legislation: Corporations-In General-New York Statute Gives Special Treat-
ment to Close Corporations-N.Y. Laws 1961, ch. 855, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 854 (1962).
9. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(b).
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visions in all three documents which they draw for their clients: the
shareholder's agreement0 preceeding the actual incorporation, the cer-
tificate of incorporation and the bylaws. The placing of the provisions
in the certificate will presumably (except for section 620(b) pro-
visions) 1' require the same percentage for removal as any other certificate
amendment, an obvious advantage to the structural stability of the close
corporation because of the attendant difficulty of approval and one
which may not be obtainable with regard to bylaws unless there is a
provision for unanimous director action.'- Thus, all of the provisions,
which are discussed infra, are proper subjects for inclusion in the cer-
tificate, and, of course, should also be contained in the prior shareholder
agreement and the subsequent bylaws.
Before discussing specific certificate provisions, it also should be
observed that most will be unnecessary for the one-man corporation
under the new law. The principal problem with the one-man corpo-
ration in the past has been due to the necessity for two dummies to
fill the statutory requirement of a three-man board of directors. But
Pinocchio was not the only dummy who ever came to life. The problem,
of course, was by careful draftsmanship to keep these superfluous
directors from causing trouble. This will no longer be necessary since
the dummies may be eliminated. New York, following Delaware's lead,' 3
amended the B.C.L. to allow a one-director board in one-man corpo-
rations.'" Where there is to be only one stockholder, then, the corporate
practitioner can forget about his drafting problems, and collect his
10. See Fromkin v. Merrall Realty, Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 2SS, 215 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. CL
1961), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 919, 225 N.Y.S.2d 632 (2d Dep't 1962).
11. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(d) requires approval by two-thirds of all outstanding
shares entitled to vote thereon to strike out a § 620(b) provision or such greater vote as is
required by the certificate of incorporation for that purpose under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 616.
As indicated above, however, the provisions automatically terminate once one share is trans-
ferred or issued to a nonconsenting person unless he had "knowledge or notice." Obviously,
where § 620(b) provisions are relied upon, the number of authorized shares must be carefully
limited to prevent the board from issuing shares to outsiders, and restrictions on share
transfers must be carefully drafted. Note, however, that an absolute prohibition on transfer
will probably be void. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d $34, 141 N.E.2d 312, 161
N.Y.S.2d 41S (1957). So far as possible, it should be guaranteed that every certificate for
shares will bear a sufficient notice of the § 620(b) provisions.
12. It should also be noted that for changes in the bylaws only approval of shareholders
entitled to vote in the election of directors is required. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 601. It is
simpler to place all necessary dose-corporate provisions in the certificate where blanket
approval of all shareholders can be required, if so desired. N.X. Bus. Corp. Law §§ S03(c),
616(a) (2).
13. De. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 171.
14. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702(a).
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fee with little difficulty.' The client must be warned, however, to consult
his attorney before selling any of his stock or issuing any new stock.10
The statute also allows a two-stockholder corporation to have a two-
director board.17 If both financial and control interests are to be equal,
most drafting problems will be alleviated.' Wherever, on the other
hand, either control or profit participation are to be unequal, the old
problems will remain, although in slightly less exacerbated form.
A final prefatory word should be added before the list. The simplest
way of solving close-corporation problems is to allocate both profit
distribution and power distribution in accordance with share holdings.
This is one reason why "stock provisions" are listed first. Also, section
620(a) expressly recognizes the validity of arrangements governing the
participants' voting as shareholders,9 and more significantly, such ar-
rangements are not subject to termination, as are director-controlling
ones, when shares are transferred to nonparticipants. The desideratum
then, is, so far as possible, without becoming "improperly restrictive of
the discretion or powers of the directors in their management of corporate
affairs,120 to allocate control over profits and management operation to
the shareholders, instead of the board of directors.
III. STOCK PROVISIONS
1. Restrictions on Transfer of Shares.-Certain restraints on the
transfer of stock are essential to guarantee that whatever corporate
arrangement is made for share of profits or control will be maintained.
Present law recognizes "reasonable restrictions" on transfer, including
a required first offer to the corporation. 2' The B.C.L. is silent except
that section 508(d) 22 apparently authorizes such restrictions. The terms
15. Until form bylaws for one-man corporations appear, however, he will at least have
to do a penciling job on the outfit ones: "The Corporation shall have one director," "A
quorum shall consist of one director," etc.
16. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702(a) provides: "[Tlhe number of directors may be less
than three but not less than the number of shareholders."
17. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702(a).
18. Other drafting problems will still remain, e.g., deadlock problems.
19. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(a) provides: "An agreement between two or more
shareholders, if in writing and signed by the parties thereto, may provide that in exercising
any voting rights, the shares held by them shall be voted as therein provided, or as they
may agree, or as determined in accordance with a procedure agreed upon by them."
20. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b).
21. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1957).
22. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 508(d) provides: "Shares shall be transferable in the manner
provided by law and in the by-laws."
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for share repurchases from retiring estates and estates of deceased par-
ticipants should also be included.
Wherever section 620(b) provisions are used, the shareholder should
also be required to give full information on such provisions to any
prospective purchaser, and the corporation should be accorded the right
to deny transfer of any shares until the transferee executes a statement
acknowledging, under oath, that he has full knowledge of such provisions
and assents thereto.
2. Pre-emptive Rights.--Ordinarly these are essential to prevent a
loophole in the close-corporation setup through the issuance of stock
to outsiders or participants anxious to secure control. Section 622 of
the B.C.L. is basically the same as the old law. -t Hence, it is generally
advisable to counteract section 622(e) -5 by expressly granting pre-
emptive rights in the situations listed.
3. Limit Authorized Slzares.--Under Section 501 (a) of the B.C.L., as
under the old law, the certificate must set forth the limit of authorized
shares 6 Also, as under the former statute, it is dangerous to authorize
the maximum number of shares available at the minimum rate without
considering that the issuance of new shares may well upset an otherwise
perfect close-corporation setup.27 Directors may issue stock up to the
full number of shares authorized. 8 Even if pre-emptive rights are avail-
able,- it must be remembered that a shareholder, who does not have
enough ready cash to pay the price fixed, may be "frozen out," even
23. It will be recalled that provisions proper for bylaws may properly be placed in the
certificate. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
24. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 39.
25. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 622(e) provides: "Unless otherwise provided in the certificate
of incorporation, shares or other securities offered for sale or subjected to rights or options,
to purchase shall not be subject to preemptive rights if they: (1) Are to be isued by the
board to effect a merger or consolidation or offered or subjected to rights or options for
consideration other than cash; (2) Are to be issued or subjected to rights or options under
paragraph (d) of Section 505 (Rights and options to purchase shares; issue of rights and
options to directors, officers and employees); (3) Are to be issued to satisfy convercion or
option rights theretofore granted by the corporation; (4) Are treasury share3; (5) Are part
of the shares or other securities of the corporation authorized in its original certificate of
incorporation and are issued, sold or optioned within two years from the date of filing,
such certificate; or (6) Are to be issued under a plan of reorganization approved in .
proceeding under any applicable act of congress relating to reorganization of corporations.'
26. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(a)(4); N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 5(3).
27. For problems which may otherwise result see Dunlay v. Avenue B1 Garage & Repair
Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930) ; see also Ross Transp., Inc. v. Crother3, ISS Md. 573 ,
45 A.2d 267 (1946).
28. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(c)-(d).
29. See subdivision 2 of text supra.
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though he is guaranteed a "right" to purchase sufficient shares to maintain
his former proportional interest. °
4. Classes of Shares.-A way of allocating profit participation through
dividends, and of guaranteeing representation on the board to persons
with smaller financial participation is provided for in Section 402 of
the B.C.L.51 Apparently, it is still possible to have shareholder A elect
two directors with his one class of stock, while his coshareholder B
elects two with his class, equal in dividend rights per share, but smaller
in number.
5. Vote by Classes.-Under section 61732 class voting is permissible.
It may be used in conjunction with classes of shares, examined in sub-
division four above. In this connection, section 706(c) (2)" 3 should also
be considered.
6. Nonvoting Shares.-Nonvoting stock, useful for giving profit return
proportional to investment while allocating control in a different way
so as to accommodate the money versus brains organization, is permissible
30. See Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906) which held
that the shareholder must pay the price (which may be considerably above par) which
the board fixes for outsiders. See also Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d
122 (1951).
31. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(a) provides: "A certificate ... shall set forth ... (4) The
aggregate number of shares which the corporation shall have the authority to issue; if
such shares are to consist of one class only, the par value of the shares or a statement that
the shares are without par value; or, if the shares are to be divided into classes, the number
of shares of each class and the par value of the shares having par value and a statement as
to which shares, if any, are without par value. (5) If the shares are to be divided into
classes, the designation of each class and a statement of the relative rights, preferences and
limitations of the shares of each class."
32. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 617 provides: "(a) The certificate of incorporation may con-
tain provisions specifying that any class or classes of shares or of any series thereof shall
vote as a class in connection with the transaction of any business or of any specified item
of business at a meeting of shareholders, including amendments to the certificate of Incorpora-
tion. (b) Where voting as a class is provided in the certificate of incorporation, it shall be
by the proportionate vote so provided or, if no proportionate vote is provided, in the elec-
tion of directors, by a plurality of the votes cast at such meeting by the holders of shares
of such class entitled to vote in the election, or for any other corporate action, by a
majority of the votes cast at such meeting by the holders of shares of such class entitled
to vote thereon. (c) Such voting by class shall be in addition to any other vote, including
vote by class, required by this chapter and by the certificate of incorporation as permitted
by this chapter."
33. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706(c) (2) provides: "When by the provisions of the certificate
of incorporation the holders of the shares of any class or series, or holders of bonds are
entitled to elect one or more directors, any director so elected may be removed only by
the applicable vote of the holders of the shares of that class or series, or the holders of
such bonds, voting as a class." Provision for class voting for directors thus may be a
valuable means of guaranteeing the desired control where financial participation is to be
unequal.
[Vol. 31
1962] CLOSE CORPORATION 333
(as under present law) under section 613.: 4 Note, however, that shares
which are entitled to preference in distribution of dividends or assets
must not be labelled "common," while those which have no such pref-
erence may not be called "preferred." 35
7. Preferred Stock-Another way of providing for disproportionate
profit versus control is through preferred stock. Such a provision
naturally is permissible,3" if stated in the certificate.3 Cumulative
preferred is one way of granting the inactive man a share of the profits
which might otherwise all be distributed through salaries to the active
participants.
S. Denial of Right to Board To Fix Preferenccs.-The issuance of
preferred stock in series is probably unnecessary for a close corporation.
It is advisable to deny this right,38 and also to deny the board the right
to determine preferences.3
9. Deny Right to Directors To Fix No-Par Consideration.-Where
no-par stock is used (no very good reason appears for using no-par
instead of low-par), and unless additional issuance is prohibited, the
shareholders should probably be the ones to control the issuance and
consideration. A provision negating power in directors, therefore, should
be employed.4"
34. See also N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 501(a).
35. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 501(b). It is probably advisable to entitle preferred and other
nonvoting shareholders to vote on merger, consolidation and sale of assets, to avoid a
"squeeze-out" by the majority through such devices. See O'Neal & Denrin, Expulzion or
Oppression of Business Associates: "Squeeze-Outs" in Small Enterprises 67-31 (1961). Note
that not even appraisal rights are available on a cash sale conditioned upon distribution
within one year and dissolution. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 910(a) (1) (b). See Hornstein,
T McKinney's N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, App. 2, pp. 251, 252 (reprinted from 2 HornAtein,
Corporation Law and Practice (Supp. 1962, at 149-50). A good "squeeze-out" device is thus
provided.
36. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 501(a).
37. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(a) (5). See also subdivision 6 of text supra.
38. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(a) (6) provides: "A certificate ... shall set forth ... If
the shares of any preferred class are to be issued in series, the designation of each series
and a statement of the variations in the relative rights, preferences and limitations as between
series insofar as the same are to be fixed in the certificate of incorporation, and a statement
of any authority to be vested in the board to establish and designate series and to iC the
variations in the relative rights, preferences and limitations as between series."
39. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 502(c) which provides: "If any such number of shares
or any such designation, relative right, preference or limitation of the shares of any reries
is not fixed in the certificate of incorporation, it may be fixed by the board, to the Lntent
authorized by the certificate of incorporation."
40. In this connection N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(d) provides: "Shares without par
value may be issued for such consideration as is fixed from time to time by the board
unless the certificate of incorporation reserves to the shareholders the right to fix thL-
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10. Automatic Cancellation of Reacquired Shares.-The disposition
of shares reacquired on the death or retirement of a participant must
be considered. If not cancelled, they become treasury shares,41 and unless
the certificate provides otherwise, are not subject to pre-emptive rights.42
Even with pre-emptive rights, there are dangers to participants tempo-
rarily "strapped for cash. 43 The certificate may, however, provide
for automatic cancellation of all reacquired shares. 4 If this is done,
reissuance ought to be forbidden and reduction in the authorized shares
should be required. 45
11. Deny Right To Issue Rights and Options To Purchase Shares
Except by Proper Shareholder Action.-As indicated previously,40 the
issuance of new shares can upset the best made close-corporation plans.
Unless special additional financing is contemplated, the power to issue
such rights or options should probably be denied.47
12. Deny Power To Issue Stock Unless Proper Notice Contained on
Certificates.-Notice of many special close-corporation provisions must
be set forth on every certificate of stock 48 in order to insure the perma-
consideration. If such right is reserved as to any shares, a-vote of the shareholders shall
either fix the consideration to be received for the shares or authorize the board to fix such
consideration."
41. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(b) provides: "Any shares reacquiied by the corporation
and not required to be cancelled may be either retained as treasury shares or cancelled by
the board at the time of reacquisition or at any time thereafter."
42. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 622(e) (4); see also subdivision 2 of text supra.
43. See subdivision 3 of text supra.
44. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(a).
45. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 515(e) provides: "Shares cancelled under this section shall
be restored to the status of authorized but unissued shares, except that if the certificate of
incorporation prohibits the reissue of any shares required or permitted to be cancelled
under this section, the board shall approve and deliver to the department of state a certificate
of amendment under section 805 (Certificate of amendment or of change; contents)
eliminating such shares from the number of authorized shares."
46. See subdivisions 2 and 3 of text supra.
47. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 505(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this
section or in the certificate of incorporation, a corporation may create and issue, whether
or not in connection with the issue and sale of any of its shares or bonds, rights or options
entitling the holders thereof to purchase from the corporation shares of any class or series,
whether authorized but unissued shares, treasury shares or shares to be purchased or ac-
quired, upon such consideration, terms and conditions as may be fixed by the board."
48. E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 616(c) (high quorum and vote requirements for share-
holder action); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 709(c) (high quorum and vote requirements for
director action); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609(h) (irrevocability of proxies); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 1002 (dissolution provisions); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 508(b) (rights and
preferences) ; N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) (director sterilizing). See also as to restrictions
on share transfers N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 176; N.Y. Uniform Commercial Code § 8-204
(eff. Sept. 27, 1964).
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nence of the close-corporate setup. It would seem to be within the power
of the corporation to forbid the issuance of noncomplying certificates14
or at least to prohibit the transfer of them. 0 In any event, they should
be denied voting and dividend rights, if improperly executed or trans-
ferred.
If section 620(b) provisions are used, it is best to require that these
be set out in full on the stock certificates, and that no shares will be
validly transferred without execution by the transferee of a sworn state-
ment acknowledging his knowledge of and assent to all of said provisions.
13. Notice on Certificates of Close-Corporate Provisions.-As noted
above, all certificates for shares should bear proper "notice"-at least a
reference to the applicable charter and bylaw provisions-of all special
close-corporation provisions. Where section 620(b) provisions are used,
they should probably be set forth in full. The certificate of incorporation
ought to prescribe the form of noticeY'
14. Deny Right To Issue Any Stock (Even Though Part of Author-
ized) Without Shareholder Approval.-A prohibition against the issuance
of stock without shareholder approval is especially desirable where
authorized shares exceed issued shares. Such a limitation, however, might
be considered as improperly restrictive of the discretion of the directors,
i.e., constitute a section 620(b) provision. Granting pre-emptive rights
in all unissued stock after a certain date would not seem subject to this
objection.52
15. Cumulative Voting.--Where financial participation is to be un-
equal, but assurance of some control to the minority is desired without
use of classes of shares, cumulative voting may be used to secure board
representation to the financial minority. As under present law, provisions
for cumulative voting must be in the certificate of incorporation. 3
Obviously, the number of shares must also be sufficient under the for-
mula," and classification of the terms of directors" (ordinarily not
49. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(b).
50. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 503(d).
51. Such a provision would seem to be permissible in the certificate under N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 402(b).
52. In this regard N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 622(e) states: "Unless otherise provided in
the certificate of incorporation, shares or other securities offered for sale or subjected to
rights or options to purchase shall not be subject to preemptive rights if they ... (5) Are
part of the shares or other securities of the corporation authorized in its original certificate
of incorporation and are issued, sold or optioned within two years from the date of filing
such certificate. ...
53. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 613.
54. Williams, Cumulative Voting for Directors 40-42 (1951).
55. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 704.
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advisable for close corporations) should not be used unless the number
of directors at each election is sufficient under the formula."
IV. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
A. Shareholders vs. Directors
16. High Vote and Quorum Requirements for Shareholder and Di-
rector Action.--A veto over corporate action may still be given to a
minority financial interest through the use of high quorum and high vote
requirements. The provisions of Section 9 of the Stock Corporation
Law are carried over in B.C.L. Section 616, as to shareholders, and
B.C.L. Section 709, as to directors. Where, however, unanimity is
required for all actions, probabilities of deadlock are multiplied. In some
instances, selective use, e.g., for amendment of the bylaws and certificate,
election of directors, 57 and so forth, may be advisable. As under the pres-
ent law, these provisions must be in the certificate to be valid. It should be
specifically stated in the certificate that the deletion of section 616 and
section 709 provisions is only permitted when approved by a specified
percentage of shareholders. Otherwise, two-thirds of the voting share-
holders will be able to excise a unanimity requirement. 8 Of course, if
unanimous quorum requirements necessitate that notice of adjourned
shareholder and director meetings be given to absent persons,59 such
explicit charter provisions may not be necessary.
17. Limit Number of Directors.-The number of directors (not even
the minimum-maximum) need not be fixed in the certificate.00 "Packing
the board" is a good way of shifting the original corporate control
setup. Obviously, if the number is set forth in the certificate and high
voting requirements are present, this cannot be done. Changes in the
number should also be subject to "high-vote" shareholder approval. 0'
56. For these reasons subdivision 4 of text supra seems to be preferable.
57. This is especially important because under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706(d) an action
to remove a director "for cause" may be brought by 10% of the shareholders even though
they are nonvoting. See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957) where the
court held that "a planned scheme of harassment" constituted legal basis for removing a
director. A requirement for unanimity to elect a new director should help to frustrate this
statute, since if the removed director is a shareholder, he can prevent the election of any
successor not satisfactory to him. Perhaps also high director vote should be required to
prevent petition for dissolution under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1102.
58. See Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporation in New York Under Its
New Business Corporation Law, 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 5 (1961). See also subdivision 17
of text infra.
59. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 605(b), 711(d).
60. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702(a).
61. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702(b) provides that the number of directors may be changed
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18. Directors Must Be Shareholders.-Under section 701 the only
requirement for directors is that they be twenty-one years of age. Thus,
they need not be shareholders unless the certificate or bylaws so require.
Not only this qualification, however (which will guarantee against out-
siders), but presumably others, e.g., as to quantity of share ownership,
would seem permissible. 2
19. Vacancies on Board To Be Filled by Slzareholders.-Section 705
of the B.C.L. provides that newly created directorships and vacancies
may be filled by the directors, unless the certificate or bylaws provide
otherwise. Note, this is a loophole which should be plugged. If it is
not, a situation as in Gearing v. Kelly 3 could recur.
20. Removal of Directors Without Cause.-This is not advisable un-
less dummies are used. 4 Where they are, the certificate or bylaws may
provide for removal by shareholders. 3 Obviously, it is never advisable
where the board reflects real corporate participation, unless a high
shareholder vote requirement prevents removal of a minority represent-
ative.
21. Deny Directors Power To Remove Other Directors.-This pro-
hibition is not really necessary, but it does prevent later adoption of
a bylaw allowing such a removal."'
22. Deny Directors Power To Fix Their Own Compensation.-Repre-
sentation on the board may not be proportional to share interest. Salaries
are a way of allocating distribution of corporate profits in lieu of
dividends. The matter should, therefore, ordinarily be left to the share-
holders, where financial interest may be reflected in voting rights.
Unless the right is denied them, however, directors have the power to fix
their own compensation."7
23. Deny Directors the Power To Mortgage or Pledge Assets.-This
is another loophole which should be plugged in order to prevent the
by amendment of the bylaws, or by action of the board or shareholder if the bylaw5 allow.
It would seem desirable to forbid bylaw change in this regard (this would seem legal under
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(b)), or to impose high vote and quorum requirements to amend
the bylaws or at least this provision.
62. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 701 provides: "The certificate of incorporation or the by-
laws may prescribe other qualifications for directors."
63. 15 App. Div. 2d 219, 222 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1st Dep't 1961), affd, 11 N.Y.Zd 201, 1S2
N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d S97 (1962).
64. Compare Stevens, Close Corporations and the New York Business Corporation Law
of 1961, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 4S1, 4S9 (1962). Stevens seems to regard the statutory authoriza-
tion (N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706(b)) for such a provision as important to dose corpora-
tions. It may, however, be double-edged.
65. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706(b).
66. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706(a).
67. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(c).
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sabotaging of the entire corporation. If the certificate does not provide
otherwise, shareholder consent is not necessary.08
24. Limit the Permissible Contents of the Bylaws.-It is safer to
have basic control matters dealt with in the certificate rather than the
bylaws, simply because it may be more difficult to alter.10 Important
provisions thus should be withdrawn from bylaw change."0
25. Expressly Deny Directors the Right To Amend Bylaws.-Direc-
tors have the power to amend, repeal or adopt bylaws "under authority
granted by the certificate .... ," While this probably means that they
do not have the right unless the certificate grants it, it is safer to deny
the right expressly.
26. "Sterilizing" the Board.-This apparently may be done, but only
under authority of section 620(b), and subject to its limitations. Pre-
sumably, all powers can be taken from the board, but a corporation
must still have to have one.72 As indicated above, provisions which re-
move powers which the board ordinarily would possess should be sepa-
rately stated at the end of provisions justified by other sections of the law.
A prefatory statement, such as, "so long as the following are permitted
under Section 620(b) of the Business Corporation Law . . ." might be
advisable, after a statement that "none of the foregoing are to be termi-
nated as a result of the termination of the effectiveness of the following."
B. Officers
27. Officers To Be Elected by Shareholders.-The new law73 allows
election of officers by shareholders. This validates shareholder (and
certificate) provisions guaranteeing continuation of office and set sala-
ries.74
28. Prescribe Powers of Officers.-Although attempts at denying the
ordinary powers of officers may fail as to outsiders, duties may be pre-
scribed vis-h.-vis the corporation. 0 Consider dividing duties, e.g., the
68. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 911.
69. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 601(b) provides: "The by-laws may contain any provision
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, its rights or powers
or the rights or powers of its shareholders, directors or officers, not inconsistent with tills
chapter or any other statute of this state or the certificate of incorporation."
70. Consider forbidding bylaws to allow removal of director by shareholders. See note
64 supra.
71. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 601(a).
72. See note 8 supra.
73. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(b).
74. See Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1,
54-55 (1961). But see subdivision 29 of text infra.
75. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(g).
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signing of checks, among officers from different factions and denying
powers to dummy officers appointed. Quacre: AIust a corporation have
the ordinary complement of officers?7"
29. Officers' Terms.--Provisions should be made to avoid the termi-
nation of office at the next annual meeting.Y7
30. Removal of Officers Without Cause.-Officers elected by the
shareholders may be removed only by them.78 This may be without
cause, and, hence, is dangerous to the minority unless a high shareholder
vote is required. Note that director-appointed officers are removable by
directors, even without cause.7 9
31. Deny Loss of Salary to Officers on Suspension.-Even officers
appointed by the shareholders may be suspended by the board." It
is advisable to provide that such suspension will not mean suspension
of salary for participant officers. 8' Also, perhaps a pension for removed
or suspended officers might be wise. 2
32. Designate Important Persons by Special (Nonofficcr) Titles.-
Because of the board's power of suspension of officers under section
716(a), and since an action to remove officers "for cause" may be
brought by ten per cent of the shareholders, even though nonvoting,'^
76. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(a) provides: "The board may elect or appoint a preia-
dent, one or more vice-presidents, a secretary and a treasurer, and such other offcr3 as
it may determine, or as may be provided in the by-lav.. ' Consider also, e.g., such provisions
as those involved in In the Matter of Venice Amusement Corp., 32 ,isc. 2d 122, 222
N.Y.S.2d 8S9 (Sup. CL 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 14 App. Div. 2d 742, 220 N.Y.S2d
47 (Ist Dep't 1961) (memorandum decision). The lower court summarized them as follos:
"[T]he corporate by-laws prohibit the president from appointing, employing or removing
any agent or employee without the concurrence of the vice-president and secretary and
without the prior approval of the board of directors ... and from taking any corporate action
or transacting any corporate business without the prior consent of the vice-president and
the secretary. All notes and bills payable, checks, drafts, warrants and other negotiable
instruments and contracts require the signature of the secretary or treasurer and the counter-
signature of the president or vice-president. All other corporate documents rcquite the
signatures of three officers." Id. at 123-24, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 890. Upon the death of one of
the participants the court held that dissolution was "justified, if not required," since "further
transaction of business by the officers and directors was illegal under the charter and by-laws
of the corporation." Id. at 124, 222 N.Y.S.2d at S90.
77. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(c).
78. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 716(a).
79. Ibid.
SO. Ibid.
31. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 716(b) proides: "The removal of an officer without cause
shall be without prejudice to his contract rights, if any. The election or appointment of an
officer shall not of itself create contract rights."
S2. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(13).
83. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 716(c).
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it is advisable to have important high-salaried jobs given to "general
managers," ".plant managers," "store managers," "general superin-
tendents," and so forth, instead of "officers." Quaere: Is denying di-
rectors the power to suspend these nonofficers a section 620(b) pro-
vision? Perhaps it would be advisable to give key brain participants
long-term contracts with appropriate damage clauses, without mention
of the job in the certificate, but with a general provision authorizing
such positions.
33. Long-Term Employment Contracts.-Any close corporation should
be expressly empowered to enter into long-term employment contracts,
although even if not expressly authorized, such contracts are probably
valid, if made for a reasonable time.84
V. DEADLOCK PROVISIONS
34. Dissolution.-Section 1002 of the B.C.L. allows a certificate of
incorporation to provide that any shareholder, or the holders of any
specified number or proportion of the total outstanding shares may
enforce dissolution of the corporation at will or upon the occurrence of
any specified event." A draftsman should provide conditions of dis-
solution as far as possible. 6 Section 1104(b) or (c) provisions8" cannot
be avoided, but a draftsman may deny the right under section 1104(a). 85
84. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 202(a)(7), 202(a)(10), 715(c), 716(b). See also Henn,
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 351 (1961). The contract should perhaps give
the employee the option to renew. In this way the term of the contract can be limited to a
shorter period, i.e., be "reasonable," and still give the employee adequate protection.
85. E.g., consideration should be given providing for automatic dissolution upon removal
of any director. See note 86 infra.
86. See, e.g., 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 10.28 (1958) giving a shareholder the right
to dissolve unless other shareholders buy him out.
87. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104 provides: "(b) If the certificate of incorporation pro-
vides that the proportion of votes required for action by the board, or the proportion of
votes of shareholders required for election of directors, shall be greater than that otherwise
required by this chapter, such a petition may be presented by the holders of more than one-
third of all outstanding shares entitled to vote on dissolution under article 10 (Non-judicial
dissolution). (c) Notwithstanding any provision in the certificate of incorporation, any
holder of shares e~titled to vote at an election of directors of a corporation, may present a
petition for its dissolution on the ground that the shareholders are so divided that they
have failed, for a period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to
elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the
election and qualification of their successors."
88. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104(a) provides: "Unless otherwise provided in the certificate
of incorporation, the holders of one-half of all outstanding shares of a corporation entitled
to vote in an election of directors may present a petition for dissolution on one or more of
the following grounds: (1) That the directors are so divided respecting the management of
the corporation's affairs that the votes required for action by the board cannot be obtained,
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35. Arbitration.-Under the B.C.L. there is no specific author-
ization for arbitration. Parties may agree to arbitrate even nonjusticiable
questions under the new New York Civil Practice Law and Rules which
will replace the Civil Practice Act." Whether or not a director should
be removed is apparently also arbitrable now."
VI. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
36. Inspection Rights.-B.C.L. Section 624 is probably not intended
to change the common-law right of inspection of corporate books. Ap-
parently, it is possible to extend inspection rights if desired.
37. Director Sterilizing Provisions.-Director "sterilization" may be
accomplished in many ways, e.g., stripping the board of all power;
transfer of all management to an officer or outsider; provisions requiring
shareholder approval of all director action; limiting the power of the
directors to fire officers or change their salaries (unless subdivision 27
supra is used); perhaps even the financial arrangement provisions of
a Clark v. Dodge5 ' agreement may be construed to be "director steriliz-
ing" provisions. Director sterilizing provisions must be in the certificate
of incorporation (if inserted by amendment, unanimous shareholder ap-
proval by voting and nonvoting shareholders is required), ° -" and are
subject to automatic termination as discussed above.
38. Irrevocable Proxies.-Irrevocable proxies may now be given in
connection with a shareholders' voting agreement.03 This is useful
to insure that an agreed upon voting plan will be carried out. It is
probably best to mention the authority for this provision in the certificate.
39. Otkers.--B.C.L. Section 402(b) provides:
The certificate of incorporation may set forth any provision, not inconsistent with
this chapter or any other statute of this state, relating to the business of the corpora-
tion, its affairs, its rights or powers, or the rights or powers of its shareholders,
directors or officers including any provision relating to matters which under this
chapter are required or permitted to be set forth in the by-laws. It is not necessary
(2) That the shareholders are so divided that the votes required for the election of directors
cannot be obtained. (3) That there is internal dissension and two or more factions of share-
holders are so divided that dissolution would he beneficial to the shareholders."
S9. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. § 7501, effective Sept. 1, 1963, provides: "A written agree-
ment to submit any controversy thereafter arising or any existing controversy to arbitration
is enforceable without regard to the justiciable character of the controversy and confers
jurisdiction on the courts of the state to enforce it and to enter judgment on an award."
90. See comment to N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706(d); see also Kezsler, supra note 74, at
59-60.
91. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
92. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b).
93. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609(f) (5). Compare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com-
bined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
1962]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to set forth in the certificate of incorporation any of the powers enumerated in
this chapter.
Quaere: Whether these provisions can go further than was allowed under
the old law9 4 without being considered section 620(b) provisions?
VII. SUMMARY
It has been previously stated, but bears reiteration, that this has been
a mere checklist of provisions which a lawyer might consider inserting
in the certificate of incorporation of his closely held corporations when
the new New York B.C.L. goes into effect."5 Some of the provisions are
inconsistent with one another. Many will be unnecessary if others are
used. Most may be omitted if the lawyer is willing to place his confidence
in the proper interpretation of Section 620(b) of the B.C.L. Other pro-
visions may seem essential which have not even been mentioned. At
least, however, this list should point up areas of draftsmanship from
which the close-corporation lawyer may draw a few aids in the difficult
task of properly launching his close-corporation clients on the road to
successful operation.
94. See Stevens, supra note 64, at 487.
95. It goes without saying, of course, that all of the provisions required by N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 402 (certificate of incorporation; contents) must also be inserted. Undoubtedly,
a printed Blumberg form will be available when the law goes into effect, and will prevent
omission of such required statements as the name of the corporation, its purpose, tle loca-
tion of its office, designation of the secretary of state as process agent, etc.
